While eminently successful for the transmission of data, Shannon's theory of information does not address semantic and subjective dimensions of data, such as relevance and surprise. We propose an observer-dependent computational theory of surprise where surprise is de ned by the relative e n tropy b e t ween the prior and the posterior distributions of an observer. Surprise requires integration over the space of models in contrast with Shannon's entropy, which requires integration over the space of data. We show how surprise can be computed exactly in a number of discrete and continuous cases using distributions from the exponential family with conjugate priors. We s h o w that during sequential Bayesian learning, surprise decreases like 1 =N and study how surprise di ers and complements Shannon's de nition of information.
Introduction
The notion of information is central to science, technology, and many other human endeavors. While several approaches for quantifying information have beenproposed, the most successful one so far has been Claude Shannon's de nition introduced over half a century ago 20, 18, 4, 8] . According to Shannon, the information contained in a data set D is given by ; log P(D), and the average information over all possible data sets D is the entropy H(P(D)) = ; R D P(D) l o g P(D)dD.
Although it has been eminently successful for the development o f m o dern telecommunication and computer technologies, Shannon's de nition does not capture all aspects of information and comes with a number of shortcomings that may in part explain why the theory has not been as successful as one would have hoped in other areas of science such as biology, psychology, or economics.
A rst concern is that it fails to account how data can have di erent signi cance for di erent observers. This is rooted in the origin of the probabilities used in the de nition of information. These probabilities are de ned according to an observer or a model M which Shannon does not describe explicitly so that the information in a data set is rather the negative log-likelihood model classes M 1 and M 2 ) with models M 1 and M 2 and assign information ; log P(DjM 1 ) and ; log P(DjM 2 ) to the data relative to each model. This however remains unsatisfactory. In particular, even if the two l i k elihoods were the same, the data D could carry di erent a m o u n ts of information for O 1 and O 2 depending on their expectations. Thus information ought to depend on the observer and also on his expectations. Indeed Shannon's theory of information explicitly ignores any notions of relevance or semantics in the data. As pointed out in the title of Shannon's seminal article, it is a theory of communication, in the sense of transmission rather than information. It concentrates on the problem of \reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point" regardless of the relevance of the message. But there is clearly more to information than data reproducibility a n d somehow information ought to depend also on the model or hypothesis M, or rather on the class M of such m o d e l s .
Shannon's theory also produces a well-known paradoxical e ect that is often puzzling to new students in information theory. How is it that \white snow", the most boring of all television programs, carries the most Shannon information? On one hand, it is clear that the uniform distribution has the highest entropy and reproducing a snow pattern exactly requires a very large numberof bits. On the other hand, producing \snow-like" patterns is very easy. How can we reconcile the two viewpoints in a rigorous way? Notice that this paradox has nothing to do with the complexity of the generative model being used. A high order Markov model of the television images would still make s n o w highly improbable and therefore highly informative from Shannon's standpoint.
In short, there seems to be room for developing concepts of information that complement or extend Shannon's de nition. The main purpose here is to develop a computational theory of subjective information surprise, or surprise. Surprise, no matter how one de nes it, is obviously related to Shannon's information: a rare event is in general surprising and ought to carry a great deal of Shannon information due to its low probability. But beyond this obvious relationship, a theory of surprise should to be able to measure information surprise that is contained in data (1) in an observer-dependent way (2) related to his changes in expectation (3) through a de nition that clearly establishes a connection with the foundations of probability theory and (4) clari es the \white snow" paradox and related concerns.
If such a de nition exists, it must rst of all berelated to the foundations of the notion of probability, which can be approached from a frequentist or subjectivist, also called Bayesian, point of view 3, 6] . Here we follow the Bayesian approach which has been prominent in recent years and has led to important developments in many elds 12, 10] . The de nition we propose stems directly from the Bayesian foundation of probability theory, and the relation given by B a yes theorem between the prior and posterior probabilities of an observer (see also 23]). The amount of surprise in the data for a given observer can be measured by looking at the change that has taken place in going from the prior to the posterior probabilities.
Information and Surprise
In the subjectivist framework, degrees of belief or con dence are associated with hypotheses or models. It can beshown that under a small set of reasonable axioms, these degrees of belief can berepresented by real numbersand that when rescaled to the 0,1] interval these degrees of con dence must obey the rules of probability and in particular Bayes theorem 9, 19, 15] . Speci cally, if an observer has a model M for the data, associated with a prior probability P(M), the arrival of a data set D leads to a reevaluation of the probability in terms of the posterior distribution P(MjD) = P(DjM)P(M) P(D)
The e ect of the information contained in D is clearly to change the belief of the observer from P(M) to P(MjD). Thus, a complementary way of measuring information carried by the data D is to measure the distance between the prior and the posterior. To distinguish it from Shannon's communication information, we call this notion of information the surprise information or surprise 
Alternatively, we can de ne the single model surprise by the log-odd ratio S(D M) = log P(M) P(MjD) (6) and the surprise by its average
taken with respect to the prior distribution over the model class. In statistical mechanics terminology, the surprise can also be viewed as the free energy of the negative log-posterior at a temperature t = 1, with respect to the prior distribution over the space of models 2].
Note that this de nition addresses the \white snow" paradox. At the time of snow onset, the image distribution we expect and the image we perceive a r e v ery di erent and therefore the snow carries a great deal of both surprise and Shannon's information. Indeed snow may bea sign of storm, earthquake, toddler's curiosity, or military putsch. But after a few seconds, once our model of the image shifts towards a snow model of random pixels, television snow perfectly ts the prior and hence becomes boring. Since the prior and the posterior are virtually identical, snow frames carry 0 surprise although megabytes of Shannon's information.
The similarities and di erences of surprise with Shannon's information should now beclear|in particular, surprise is a dual notion that requires integration over the space of models rather than the space of data. In the next sections, we show h o w t h i s i n tegration can be carried analytically in simple cases. As is the case for Bayesian inference, however, integration over the space of models in general is likely to require Monte Carlo methods. Information is also bound to vary when data is received sequentially, i.e. during learning processes. Therefore we also show how the proposed de nition is related to the behavior of learning curves. Details of calculations are provided in the Appendix.
Computation of Surprise
Here we consider a data set D = fx 1 : : : x N g containing N points.
Surprise can be calculated exactly in a numberofinteresting cases. For simplicity, although this does not correspond to any restriction of the general theory, we consider only the case of conjugate priors, where the prior and the posterior have the same functional form. In this case, in order to compute the surprise de ned by Equation 5 , we need only to compute general terms of the form F(P 1 P 2 ) = Z P 1 log P 2 dx (8) where P 1 and P 2 have the same functional form. The surprise is then given by S = F(P 1 P 1 ) ; F(P 1 P 2 ) (9) where P 1 is the prior and P 2 is the posterior. Note also that in this case the symmetric divergence can easily be computed using F(P 1 P 1 ); F(P 1 P 2 )+F (P 2 P 2 );F (P 2 P 1 ). Details for the calculation of F(P 1 P 2 )
in the examples below are given in the Appendix. It should also be clear that in simple cases, for instance for certain members of the exponential family 7] of distributions, the posterior depends entirely on the su cient statistics and therefore we can expect surprise also to depend only on su cient statistics in these cases.
Discrete Data and Dirichlet Model
Consider the case where x i is binary. The simplest class of models for D is then M(p), the rst order Markov models with a single parameter p representing the probability of emitting a 1. The conjugate prior on p These results provide a clear explanation for the television \snow" e ect. With a uniform symmetric prior, the empirical distribution with maximal entropy brings the least information. If we expect snow, the Kullback-Liebler divergence between the prior and the posterior is 0 and therefore there is essentially no surprise in the signal. As pointed out, this is not the case, however, at the time of onset of the snow where the divergence may e v en be large.
Continuous Data: Unknown Mean/Known Variance
When the x i are real, we can consider rst the case of unknown mean with known variance. We h a ve a family M( ) of models, with a Gaussian prior G 1 ( 1 2 1 ). If the data has known variance 2 , then the posterior distribution is Gaussian G 2 ( 2 
the approximation being valid for large N. In the special case where the prior has the same variance has the data 1 = then the formula simplify a little and yield
when N is large. In any case, surprise grows linearly with N with a coe cient that is the sum of the prior variance and the square di erence between the expected mean and the empirical mean scaled by the variance of the data.
Continuous Data: Unknown Variance/Known Mean
When the x i are real, we can then consider the case of unknown variance with known mean. We h a ve a family M ( 2 ) 
Thus surprise information scales linearly with N, with a coe cient of proportionality t h a t t ypically depends mostly on the ratio of the empirical variance to the scale parameters s 2 1 , which is roughly the expectation of the prior the expectation of the prior is 1 s 2
The e ects of very large of very small values of , o r 1 can also be seen in the formula above. In particular, surprise is largest when the empirical variance 2 goes to 0 or in nity, i.e. is very di erent from the prior expectation.
Continuous Data: Unknown Mean/Unknown Variance
When the x i are real, we can nally consider the case of unknown mean with unknown variance. We have a family M( 2 ) of models, with a conjugate prior G 1 ; 1 = P( j 2 )P ( 2 ) = G 1 
Surprise information is linear in N with a coe cient that is essentially the sum of the coe cients derived in the unknown mean and unknown variance partial cases.
Learning and Surprise
There is an immediate connection between surprise and computational learning theory. If we imagine that data points from a training set are presented sequentially, we can consider that the posterior distribution after the N-th point becomes the prior for the next iteration (sequential Bayesian learning). In this case we can expect on average surprise to decrease after each iteration, since as a system learns what is relevant i n a data set, new data points become less and less surprising. This can be quanti ed precisely, at least in simple cases. 
Learning Curves: Continuous Data
In the case of continuous Gaussian data with, for instance, known vari- 
Thus in this case surprise decreases in time with the number of examples also as 1=N.
Surprise, Evidence, and Mutual Information
To measure the e ect of the data on the prior and the posterior, one could have envisioned using the di erence between the entropy of the prior and the entropy of the posterior. However, unlike surprise which i s always positive, the di erence between these two e n tropies can be either positive or negative and therefore is not a suitable measure. In the formula given above for the surprise (Equation 5), we h a ve i n tro- 
Discussion and Extensions
Surprise is di erent from other de nitions of information that have b e e n proposed 1] as alternatives to Shannon's entropy. Most alternative de nitions, such as R enyi's entropies, are actually algebraic variations on Shannon's de nition rather than conceptually di erent approaches. While Shannon's de nition xes the model and varies the data, surprise xes the data and varies the model. Surprise is a measure of dissimilarity between the prior and posterior distributions and as such i t l i e s c l o s e t o the axiomatic foundation of Bayesian probability.
In a numberof cases, surprise can becomputed analytically bothin terms of exact and asymptotic formula. The analytical results presented here could be extended in several directions including non-conjugate and other prior distributions, more complex multidimensional distributions (e.g. multinomial, inverse Wishart), and more general families of distributions (e.g. exponential family 7]). In general, however, the computation of surprise can beexpected to require Monte Carlo methods to approximate integrals over model spaces. In this respect, the computation of surprise should bene t from progress in Markov c hain and other Monte Carlo methods, as well as progress in computing power.
While applications remain to be developed, a theory of surprise could beused in areas as diverse as game theory, machine learning, Internet commerce, and the design of sensory systems. Consider, for instance, the design of arti cial sensory systems or the reverse engineering of natural ones. Clearly, attention mechanisms play a fundamental role allowing perceptual systems to shift their resources and bring them to bearon the most surprising region of the input space. In bothnatural systems and some of their arti cial cousins, expectations could be generated by top down connections and compared in real time with input streams generated by bottom up connections 13] . Mismatches between input and expectations could becomputed using surprise theory and lead to saliency maps. These maps in turn could guide attention mechanisms by dynamically allocating additional processing resources to the regions of the input eld that are the most surprising, i.e. which carry the highest amount of information with respect to the expectations.
Likewise, we h a ve only touched upon the connection between surprise and machine learning 22] by s h o wing that surprise decreases as 1=N during sequential learning in simple cases. This analysis could be extended to more complex settings, such as arti cial neural networks.
However the notion of surprise has its own limitations. In particular, it does not capture all the semantics/relevance aspects of data. When the degree of surprise of the data with respect to the model class becomes low, the data is no longer informative for the given model class. This, however, does not necessarily imply that one has a good model since the model class itself could be unsatisfactory and in need of a complete overhaul. The process by w h i c h w e decide a model class is unsatisfactory in an alternative free setting, the open-ended aspect of inference, has so far eluded precise formalizations.
Conversely, highly surprising data could be a sign that learning is required or that the data is irrelevant. If while sur ng the web in search o f a car one stumbles on a picture of Marilyn Monroe, the picture may carry a low degree of relevance, a high degree of surprise, and a low-to-high amount of Shannon information depending on the pixel structure. Thus, relevance, surprise, and Shannon's entropy are three di erent facets of information that can be present i n d i e r e n t c o m binations. The notion of relevance in particular seems to be the least understood although there have been several attempts 16, 21] . A possible direction is to consider, in addition to the space of data and models, a third space A of actions or interpretations and de ne relevance as the relative entropy between the prior P(A) and the posterior P(AjD) distributions over A. Whether this approach simply shifts the problem into the de nition of the set A remains to be seen. In any e v ent, the quest to understand the nature of information is unlikely to be over. 
We can use bounds of the form log a + R a 1 +n1 a 1 log xdx < log a 1 + : : : log(a 1 + n ; 1) log a 1 R a 1 +n a 1 +1 log xdx to estimate this term. Alternatively, one can assume that a 1 
here using for simplicity natural logarithms. F(G G) = The e ects of very large of very small values of , o r 1 can also be seen in the formula above. In particular, surprise is largest when the empirical variance 2 goes to 0 or in nity, i.e. is very di erent from the prior expectation.
Unknown Mean/Unknown Variance
In the case of unknown mean and unknown variance, we have a family M( 2 ) of models with a conjugate prior of the form G 1 ; 1 = P( j 2 )P ( 2 ) = G 1 ( 1 2 = 1 ); 1 ( 1 s 1 ). Thus the prior has four parameters ( 1 1 1 s 1 ) , with 1 > 0, 1 
Surprisee is linear in N with a coe cient that is essentially the sum of the coe cients derived in the unknown mean and unknown variance partial cases.
